culture, civilization, and demarcation at the northwest borders of Greece

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Ali Pasha used Greek almost as his official language, and over the gate of his castle is an inscription in Greek in which he claims descent from Pyrrhus King of Epirus. The great epic poem of more than ten thousand lines relating all his exploits which it was his great delight to have read to him by its author Hajji Sekhret, a Moslem Albanian from Dhelvino, is written entirely in Greek. A Moslem Albanian who claims in modern Greek to be a descendent of Pyrrhus and delights in a Greek epic of his own deeds recited to him by his own Homer is a most remarkable phenomenon. [Wace and Thompson 1914:192]

In early 1790, the infamous Muslim Albanian, Ali Pasha, ruler of quasi-autonomous Ottoman Epiros, launched a notorious and decisive attack on his fractious mountain-dwelling subjects, the Christian Suliotes. In the same year, Mozart's opera *Così Fan Tutte* (So Do They All, or, They're All Like That) opened in Vienna. The Albanian motif was in the air, and Mozart's librettist, Lorenzo da Ponte, made good use of it. The plot of the opera, set in Naples, is a version of the wager theme that motivates Boccaccio's *Decameron* and Shakespeare's *Cymbeline*. The story involves two Italian suitors, Ferrando and Guglielmo, who, challenged by Don Alfonso, declare their fiancées to be above temptation and agree to put this constancy to the test. Accordingly, Ferrando and Guglielmo say goodbye to the women and pretend to leave for war. In short order they return, disguised as dashing Albanian noblemen. The ladies' maid, Despina—the name is Greek—is the first to greet the exotically attired "Albanians." She is impressed but voices confusion. Announcing the visitors to her mistresses, she exclaims, "What appearances! what costumes! what figures! what mustaches! I don't know if these creatures are Vlachs or Turks; Vlachs, Turks; Turks, Vlachs?"[1] How perfect an expression of the anomalous and vexing position of the Albanian in Adriatic civilization.[2] Despina knows the men are not Greeks. Only two possibilities remain—will they be Turks or Latins? (In the 18th century, the Vlachs were transhumant pastoralists, merchants, and intellectuals widely dispersed throughout the southern Balkans, and they spoke a Latin language.) And furthermore does this costuming,

The collapse of the Communist regime in Albania after 1990 led to overt tensions between Greece and Albania as a result, on the one hand, of massive illegal Albanian immigration to Greece and, on the other, new questions concerning the status and security of the Greek minority in southern Albania. During the 20th century, nation-construction across the Greek-Albanian border involved the reciprocal differentiation of heterogeneous populations into bipolar Greek and Albanian nationalities. In this article, I consider the public rhetoric and diplomatic processes involved in distinguishing Greek and Albanian populations. I suggest that through attention to border history, segmentary models of cultural identity can be usefully married to the theory of nationalism at the scale of the state. The Greek-Albanian case demonstrates both the centrality of the border to the legitimation of the state and the marginality of actual border populations who persistently generate conditions of social heterogeneity. [Greece, Albania, nationalism, ethnicity, border, stereotype]

do those mustaches, signify less or more? Are they manly chiefs—or puppets? Clearly these Albanians are hilariously, extravagantly, indecipherable.

stealing and plundering

However trivial and fantastic the conceit appears, da Ponte's scenario made good cultural and political sense in 1790 and has not lost its resonance today. The Albanian of Greek popular ideology is still a shadowy figure. When the Albanian national football team played a match against its Greek counterpart in Athens in 1990, the Athenian fans chanted: "You don't have a country [homeland]/ You don't have a people/ What are you doing here/ On this playing field?" [Dhen ekhete patridha/ Dhen ekhete lao/ Ti irthate na kanete/ Sto yipedho afto?].[3] The message is not hard to grasp. Having no place and no people, the Albanians cannot constitute a national team; if theirs is not a national team, it cannot have any place on the national playing field. Radical irredentist Greeks put the matter unambiguously:

> Stealing and plundering the cultural heritage of other peoples [Albanians] should understand that there is no question of their securing a uniform national-racial [ethnofiletiki] identity, because they have never constituted a national-racial unity. They were and are—whatever they say—the descendants of Greeks (70%), Slav-Turks (20%) and various Frankish tribes [Frangikon filon] (10%). [Giorgiou 1993:196]

On what grounds is an Albanian figured to be less determinate than a Greek, a Vlach, or a Turk? Christians in ex-Ottoman domains have frequently and strategically conflated the terms *Muslim* and *Turk* to ostracize Muslim or Muslim-descended populations as alien (as in the current Serb-Bosnian conflict; see Sells 1996), and Albanians, though of several religions, have been so labeled. But Giorgiou, for the most part, claims them as Greeks. The alleged indeterminacy of Albanians can also be exploited by Albanians themselves. News reports from early 1996 explain that during the first six months of 1995 at least 45,000 Albanians officially changed their names from Muslim or Catholic Albanian forms to Greek forms—presumably in the interests of securing visas to Greece.[4] What makes this maneuver possible is a peculiar set of conceptual conventions about the nature of Albanians and Greeks. These conventions have their origins in the models of nationality invoked by Greek and Albanian spokesmen in articulating claims to contested territory in northwest Greece and southern Albania during and after the break up of the Ottoman Empire.

Diplomatic arguments employed by Albanian and Greek spokesmen in the international arena in 1912–13 and in 1919 (at the Paris Peace Conference) share a universe of discourse but embrace complementarily opposed strategies. The vocabulary of this discourse survives into the present. In a recent letter to President Clinton, a delegation of Albanian-Americans—insisting that, despite recent crises, Albanians and Greeks have a history of close ties and cooperation—observes: "Historically the two nations have lived in peace with each other, and relations between the two peoples have continuously been cordial, mainly because there is considerable Albanian blood in Greece and considerable Greek culture in Albania" (Repishti 1994b:6).[5] It is this distinction between Albanian "blood" and Greek "culture"—terms that, as Just (1989) has shown, are characteristically elided in practice—that I intend to explore in this article. As other scholars have shown, the metaphor of blood in Greek state building has been abundantly successful (Herzfeld 1997:74). But, in the service of an expansionist civilization, Greece has also roundly attacked blood politics. In the dialectics of national self-definition, each approach has its moment.

the border and the *ethnos*

At the turn of the 20th century, the region that is now southern Albania, Greek Epiros, and northwestern Greek Macedonia (see Figure 1) held a multilingual and multireligious population, and in some quarters it still does. For example, villagers in the Florina district in the Greek

province of Macedonia may currently speak (in addition to standard Greek) Aromanian (Vlach), Macedonian (a Slavic language), a Pontic (Anatolian) dialect of Greek, or a dialect of Albanian (Arvanitika). Greek, Aromanian, Macedonian, and Albanian are also spoken by villagers in neighboring districts of Albania, and Albanians belong to several different religious traditions (Catholic, Muslim, and Greek Orthodox). But, during this century, the categories used to describe the inhabitants of these regions have undergone a series of great transformations as a result of arbitration over boundaries and the principles of citizenship.

The drawing of international borders is inevitably a matter of significance for border populations. In a historical monograph on the French-Spanish border zone that signaled the emergence of a field of border studies, Peter Sahlins makes the point that border communities, anything but passive, may "affirm their nationality without abandoning a local sense of place"; they may, in fact, "ground" their national identities in the "affirmation and defense of social and territorial boundaries against outsiders" (1989:269). In the case of the Macedonias, recent work by Brown (1993) and Karakasidou (1993, 1997a) has drawn attention to the reverberations of state building at the local level. The criteria by which citizens are compelled by the state to lay claim to identities are the product, however, of diplomatic deliberations that have another discursive locality (see Herzfeld 1993:4 on the ethnography of discursive constructs and Danforth 1995 on transnational arenas). National discourses are not collective consciousnesses, but classificatory structures articulated, as I hope to show for the case of the Albanian-Greek border, in particular historical contexts, and the biographies of identity discourses are constituted not only by the fluctuating interests of the various players but also by the dynamics of narrative structures, which involve formal and aesthetic questions (see Hammel 1972).


Figure 1. Map of southern Albania, Greek Epiros, and northwestern Greek Macedonia.

At international borders, the relationship between the concept of self-rule and the uniformity of the *ethnos* (nation) faces a crucial trial, and states exploit every opportunity for exemplary performance. Interactions with neighboring states contribute to the public determination of national character. (While Anderson [1991] focuses on relations between colony and metropole, and on states as colonial administrative and market units, he does not say much about the part played by relations among neighbors in the dynamics of nationalism.) Claims concerning nationality and territory are articulated as states engage in specific confrontations, and specific terms of human classification—like race, culture, or consciousness—become, in everyday life, both compulsory and reasonable to citizens.

My analysis has its origins in two immediate sources. The first is a series of crises in Greek-Albanian relations between 1990 and 1994. To put it simply, these crises concerned the civil and religious rights and claims of ethnic Greeks in southern Albania, which is generally called "Northern Epiros" in the Greek press (the term refers to that section of southern Albania irredentist factions assert belongs to Greece), and the political and civil rights and claims of Albanian migrants in Greece. The rhetoric employed by the two states in their interactions was striking. Pro-Berisha Albanian headlines accused dissident Greeks of "Byzantine vandalism" and fundamentalism; the Greeks for their part denounced a hypothetical Turcophile and Western-supported axis linking Albania, Thrace, Bulgaria, and Macedonia (as well as Sandzak and Bosnia). The long string of crises in Greek-Albanian relations begs for an explanation (see Hart 1995 for a more detailed review of the events of 1990–94).

In the second place, in this article I respond to puzzles that arose in my own fieldwork in northwest Greek Macedonia during this same period. I have been particularly interested in the interaction and the self-consciousness of different linguistic groups in this border zone[6] and in how these various minority-language speakers, as well as monolingual Greeks, construe their own origins according to prevalent models of nationality and citizenship. Some of those who speak another language (in addition to standard Greek) attribute this allophony to the fact—as they see it—that they, as Greeks, were compelled to speak the language of foreign masters. Latin, Slavic, or Albanian influences are cast as minor distractions in a pattern of primordial national homogeneity. In other cases, informants associate domestic language with intense non-Hellenic ethnic or political attachments.[7]

But to talk analytically in terms of language groups in this zone is to make very crude assumptions about languages and groups. Speaking Albanian, for example, is not a predictor with respect to other matters of identity. In southern Albania, bilingual populations speak Albanian and Greek, and among those who speak Greek are some who have considered themselves either politically or ethnically Greek (or, in certain cases, autonomously Northern Epirot). The several hundred thousand recent migrants from Albania into Greece include self-described ethnic Greeks as well as other kinds of Albanian citizens. There are also long-standing Christian Albanian (or Arvanitika-speaking) communities both in Epiros and the Florina district of Macedonia with unquestioned identifications with the Greek nation. Finally, Vlach-Albanians, by origin transhumant stockbreeders of the Pindus, speak Albanian as well as Aromanian and possibly Greek and Macedonian, as they have traditionally lived near and moved across all lines of the Greek-Albanian-(Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonian border. The Muslim Albanian landowning beys and farmers who were a distinct feature of the local order in Ottoman times are no longer present in Greek Epiros and Macedonia. But the diversity of the Albanian heritage in Greece reflects the character of the border itself.

The Albanian-Greek border constitutes a line continuous with the border between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and between Greece and Bulgaria. While histories of the Balkan Wars tend to focus on Macedonia, the Albanian movement for autonomy was a major factor in both conflicts.[8] Greece's relations with Macedonia have attracted considerable anthropological commentary; its relations with Albania have been less discussed,

except in the context of racism toward recent immigrants (Panourgia 1992). The Greek provinces of Epiros and Macedonia are now divided administratively from one another and have developed different political characters (see Mavrogordatos 1983:278–279), but in the past, western Macedonia and Epiros were linked in important ways and even conflated into a single polity. Before the 1912 imposition of the borders, the chief route of communications from Yannina (Ioannina) to the East was through the now Albanian city of Korçe (Koritsa, in Greek) to Florina in Greek Macedonia, to Salonika (Thessaloniki). During the Balkan Wars, the district of Korçe was included in maps of a future Greek Macedonia. From political and historical points of view, these two zones, Epiros-southern Albania and Macedonia, should be analyzed together. In particular, the predicament of ethnic Greeks in southern Albania serves as an important comparison to that of Slav-Macedonians in Greece. Greek national identity has been articulated through specific confrontations; patterns of assimilation and alienation within Greece can only be understood against the background of these confrontations.[9]

totem and stereotype

Before the drawing of national borders, at the turn of the 20th century, the linguistic and religious collectivities of the Greek-Albanian-Macedonian border zone were invariably presented in the writings of observers as a set of functionally related groups, defined by contrast and complementarity. After national borders were imposed, this systematic aspect of public identity was seemingly forgotten. If "the telos of . . . national territories is to become fully nationalized, [that is,] filled up with a homogeneous national culture" (Brubaker 1994:59), this filling-up is at the same time a conceptual detachment of national identity from the practical and imaginative relationships that give the nation its particular characteristics.

In a general sense, this process recalls a truism in the theory of social organization. Lévi-Strauss (1970) suggests that such a detachment ensues in 'totemic' societies when clans lose their cohesive relations through demographic or social change. He proposes that as the system of reciprocities among the clans decays, the sense of a literal, "physical and psychological affinity between men and their totems" (and here one could substitute a variety of national icons) increases (1970:115). Each group then internalizes stereotypes of identity modeled on the character of the totem. It is a transition, for Lévi-Strauss, from a social to a psychobiological sense of collective identity. That is, if social groups think of themselves "not so much from the point of view of their reciprocal relations in social life as each on their own account, in relation to something other than sociological reality, then the idea of diversity is likely to prevail over that of unity" (Lévi-Strauss 1970:116). As a result,

> each social group will tend to form a system no longer with other social groups but with particular differentiating properties regarded as hereditary, and these characteristics exclusive to each group will weaken the framework of their solidarity within the society. The more each group tries to define itself by the image it draws from a natural model, the more difficult will it become for it to maintain its links with other social groups and, in particular to exchange its sisters and daughters with them since it will tend to think of them as being of a particular "species." [Lévi-Strauss 1970:116–117]

Lévi-Strauss's contrast between the two ideal types of identity is helpful when we turn to the question of the production of national types. (For another view of totemism and ethnicity, see Comaroff 1987.) By definition, all boundaries are social contracts of a kind, involving compelling simplifications of a complex set of social exchanges—as Barth's (1969) now classic volume on ethnicity made very clear. Sahlins skillfully made use of what he calls an "oppositional" or "segmentary" model in his study of national formation in the Pyrenees, stressing that national categories are not simply imposed, but may be developed in a segmentary fashion as a resource in the course of local disputes (1989:9, 165; see also Herzfeld 1985:102–108). Nevertheless, Herzfeld argues that anthropologists have often treated segmentation as a "conceptual contrast

to state-like formations, and hence irrelevant to the study of occidental political life" (1993:156; see also Sollors 1986 on the nomenclature of ethnic difference). But, as I hope to show for the case of Greece and Albania, it is not in the least irrelevant. Segmentary opposition is embedded in common forms of popular self-representation, in stereotypes, jokes, slogans (like the soccer slogan above), and political rhetoric. As a result, Herzfeld (1997) has recommended that ethnographers analyze stereotypes and stereotype-based actions as part of the ethnographic field.[10] If stereotypes are "by definition reductive" (Herzfeld 1997:157), they also have a peculiar power, deriving at least in part from their rhetorical economy and from that quality of being at the same time both *langue* (language) and *parole* (speech). In times of social and political stress, ethnic jokes, elaborating stereotypes, spring up as a resource for the reconfiguration of reality, as if they expressed the always already preexisting condition of things.[11] In a similar way, then, an international border is like a dream signifier that erases its heterogeneous origins of its signifiers: it casts all differences across borders as national differences (Linde-Laursen 1995) and assures us by means of a certain aesthetic perfection that these differences are real.

the character of local groups: occupational caste, language, religion

In turning to the social topography of the border zone, I want to emphasize the well-known change over the last century in the nature of collective categories in the southern Balkans. The northern provinces of Greece have been multilingual areas for millennia. The linguistic pluralism of this area is a consequence of its historic position as a bridge between the Adriatic and the East.[12] In the late 19th century, Greek was only one of two commercial languages and a half-dozen other languages employed in daily life. Ethnic maps from all parties during the Balkan Wars agree that "the Slav, Albanian and Greek worlds meet just west of Kastoria" (Aarbakke 1992:20); the eastern frontier of the Albanian presence ran from Kastoria to Lake Ochrid.

The local groups and cultural networks that existed in northwest Greece before the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire were not discrete units with fixed internal structures and boundaries but facets of a larger society in which, and by means of which, they provisionally held a certain identity with reference to others from whom they were distinguished or with whom they were allied. Ottoman subjects were publicly identified as Muslims (or colloquially as Turks), Orthodox Christians *(Rum)*, or according to other religious categories (e.g., Armenians or Jews). But overemphasis on the contrast between 20th-century nationalism and the principles of the Ottoman *millet* system, in which the population was politically segmented according to religion, may have led scholars to ignore the ways in which linguistic distinctions also functioned as signs of social identification.

Observers writing during the Ottoman period recognized something like a linguistically coded caste structure with hereditary specializations. "The merchant," one source reported, "is a 'Greek', the intellectual a 'Serb', . . . the shepherd a 'Vlach', the laborer a 'Bulgar' " (Recatas 1934:14).[13] The blacksmiths and music-makers (for example, those who lived outside the Aromanian town of Metsovo) were by definition Gypsies.[14] Note that it is the merchant who is a Greek and not the Greek who is, inevitably, a merchant. While linguistic or ethnic categories constituted the indices of a division of labor, individuals might migrate into these categories from diverse points of origin. For their own reproduction, linguistic and regional differences require some degree of in-marriage, but in northwest Greece there was also a good deal of systematic out-marriage (systematic in the sense that certain patterns of status migration were maintained).[15]

According to Stoianovich, "official documents [of the 18th-century Balkan commercial diaspora] rarely make a clear distinction between Greek and Vlach and Orthodox Albanian merchants" (1992:50).[16] The principal contrast in the Balkans was that "[Greeks] were not

Latins" (1992:50).[17] Similarly in Albania, Orthodox and Catholic Albanian-speakers were distinguished respectively as "Greeks" and "Albanians" as early as the 11th century (Pollo and Puto 1981). In social interaction, the relevant set of oppositions (Latin:Greek, Christian:Moslem, Vlach:Greek, pastoralist:villager, villager:villager, etc.) was context dependent and shifting as indeed, colloquially, it continues to be.[18] On a day-to-day level, purely local conceptions of the collectivity, sometimes based on notions of kinship, sometimes on territory, structured marriage exchanges and economic cooperation. Certainly in Epiros and Albania, names of regions had currency (e.g., Tsamouria, Khimarra, Liapouria) and could be employed in a variety of (at times contradictory) ways as ethnic designations of peoples—Tsamides, Khimarriotes, Liapides.[19] Thus if Orthodox Christians were all Rum (Eastern Orthodox Christians) in Ottoman classification, this does not mean that other distinctions were irrelevant.

Finlay's late 19th-century description of the Suliotes gives some impression of the complexity of social categories in this area. To begin with, the Suliotes (celebrated by Byron and in Greek national history for their role in the liberation of Greece) were a "branch of the Tchamides, one of the three great divisions of the Tosks" (Finlay 1939:42)—in other words they initially spoke Albanian. The Tchamides (*Tsamides, Cham* in Albanian) were both Christian and Muslim by the late 18th century (in the 20th century, *Cham* applies to Muslims only). In their heyday, Chams reserved the name Suliote for about 100 families who, by virtue of birth, belonged to the military caste of Suli (Finlay 1939:43). In time, immigrants from elsewhere, attracted by the privileges of autonomy in Suli, assimilated and were also named Suliotes. The Greek peasants who tilled Suliot land "were distinguished by the name of the village in which they dwelt" (Finlay 1939:44). Clearly clan, class, and territorial labels had significance in addition to religious categories. The Suliotes are retrospectively classified as *omoyenis* (of Greek descent) and famous patriots, by virtue of their opposition to Turkish rule. Yet they collected taxes from both Greek and Turkish villages within their own territory, and the question of a national identity can hardly be applied here (see also Perraivos 1836).[20]

The commercial diaspora represented the upwardly mobile sector of various groups, but that sector was not equally distributed. The Greeks and the Vlachs, for example, were emphatically differentiated by class (see Dimen Schein 1970). Economically diversified and comprised of educated elites as well as laboring populations, Greeks and Vlachs constituted (in the language of ethnic theory) "incipient whole societies" (Horowitz 1985:31). At the same time, nationalist Greeks were particularly aggressive toward the Rumanianizing movement (Wace and Thompson 1914) because in certain districts in Macedonia and Albania, it was the Vlachs who formed the "backbone of Hellenism" (Aarbakke 1992:133). Macedonian Slavs, on the other hand, were mainly rural and remained primarily a laboring class. Despite the dominance of Greek in educational and religious life, Greek did not "penetrate into the family sphere" in the Florina-Bitola area (Aarbakke 1992:74). Gypsies, too, were by definition non-elite.[21]

Albanian and Turkish Muslims predominated in the landowning and political classes of Epiros and northwestern Macedonia.[22] The mobilization of national consciousness in each particular area was in many cases a function of the sentiment and interests of local elites (Sahlins 1989:165)—but not every group included an elite, nor was the elite of every group local.

Bérard's description of the Albanian Christian community of Albassan (or Elbasan) in 1896 is revealing of the complexity of cultural and political identifications in the southern Balkans. On the dividing line between the Latin-influenced north and the Greek-influenced south, the city took the form of concentric circles of, in Bérard's terms, Albanian Christians, Albanian Muslims, and Vlachs. The Christians, Bérard writes, call themselves Greek and send their children to a Greek school. They are also loyal to the Ottoman Sultan, who, they say, protects Albania from the Slavs, and they place his portrait next to the Holy Icons. "By calling themselves Greeks, they only mean to distinguish themselves from the Bulgars of Macedonia and the Catholics of high Albania [whom, by the way, they refer to as 'those Mirdite Jews']. It has never

crossed their minds to think that they might one day be the subjects of [the Greek] King George or his son" (Bérard 1911:48). At the same time, Bérard points out, they resist German efforts to persuade them that they are "Albanians" and already have learned to call their country the Epiros of Pyrrhus (1911:49). For Bérard, this identification with Greece, as opposed to Russia, is evidence of the fact that, since the Crimean War, religious consciousness has begun to give way to a "notion of and desire for progress" (1911:50). At the same time, in complementary fashion, Bérard also comes across a group of Vlachs, "speaking, thinking and singing in Greek," who "detest the Greeks," as well as a grocer from the islands who tells him in perfect Greek, "We don't speak Greek here, we're Bulgars" (1911:85).

This consciousness of a new order affected the distribution of populations well before the Balkan Wars. In Albania, Korçe is a revealing borderline case: the Korçe basin was regarded by the Greeks as part of Greek Macedonia (Aarbakke 1992:5), but it was not included in the Macedonian plans of the Bulgarians. Between the 1880s and 1907, three-quarters of the so-called Bulgarian population of the city had emigrated. During this period, this population drift was complemented elsewhere by policies of forced settlement; in order to maintain a Turkish presence in Macedonia, the Turks prevented soldiers from returning to Anatolia.[23] In any case, the Greek faction continued to feel that Korçe, with its Orthodox, non-Slavic-speaking population, belonged in the Greek and Francophile sphere of influence. Meanwhile, in composing a picture of the interpenetration of Greek and Albanian populations, it should not be forgotten that since at least the 14th-century populations of Albanian speakers existed in southern Greece, particularly in Attica, the eastern Peloponnese, and the islands. After Greek Independence, these populations of Arvanites (as they are called) were, for the most part, culturally assimilated through education, commerce, and military conscription, although their dialect of Albanian (Arvanitika) has survived to a limited extent (see Andromedas 1976; Hart 1993; Panourgia 1995; Trudgill and Tzavaras 1977; Tsitsipis 1988).

explosive materials

This historical evidence suggests that the drawing of borders in the southern Balkans was neither a matter of simply separating ready made ethnoterritorial entities nor a matter of inventing them. In the logic of social classification, what the borders established above all was the dogma that a society should be "whole" and wholly lie within its own borders. The organic metaphor generated a vocabulary of fragmentation and mutilation. By means of persuasive metaphors, irredentism—Bulgarian, Greek, Albanian, Serbian, and, indeed, Macedonian—becomes not merely policy but the crusade of individual citizens (see Jurgensmeyer 1988). Same-nation (omoyenis) communities are visualized as severed by borders from their proper homelands and thus as withering or decaying. Other-nation communities are described by politicians in the terminology of the Freudian uncanny, as introjected limbs or externalized viscera of foreign bodies. On this I can do no better than to quote Nikolaos Politis (Greek envoy in Paris) who, in 1928, protested that Albanian protection of the Albanian-speaking minority in Greek Epiros would turn these constituencies into "foreign bodies, continually filled with explosive materials" (in Mikhalopoulos 1993:155). Politis was merely following precedent. In 1826, Greece had petitioned the British ambassador at the Porte to negotiate a peace that would ensure "Greeks and Turks would no longer live together" and "districts that took up arms and suffered and shed blood for their liberty should not be cut off from the body of Greece" (Koliopoulos 1990:100).

The constitution of states in the regions of Albania, Macedonia, and Greece also involved the forging of modern links between political legitimacy and personal identity. For dynastic states, the rule of elites unconnected to indigenous populations does not pose a problem of principle, but the legitimacy of a modern state is predicated on the notion of self-rule. National

self-rule proposes a specific kind of identification of state and population, as well as certain conceptions of the self—as a simulacrum of the nation or as part of an electoral bloc—worked in the image of the state. As a consequence, the modern state's grounds and desires for legitimacy have ambivalent, often violent, effects when it comes to the heterogeneous populations of border zones. Thus, during the period of national consolidation in the 1920s and 1930s, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania employed the same techniques to eliminate what were seen as potential fifth columns: forced changes of personal names and place-names, monolingual educational systems, and restrictions on participation of minority language groups in state employment (especially the military).

Questions of boundary and citizenship in Macedonia were decided by military means in 1913. As talk of the Macedonian question was rendered superfluous, the discussion concerning southern Albania or Northern Epiros grew all the more vociferous. The Epiros border question was subjected to extensive international adjudication. The findings of the commissions were controversial. British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey declared in the House of Commons in 1913 that, while the solution to the Albanian border might seem questionable in the eyes of "anyone with local knowledge," the "primary essential" of the arrangement was to "preserve agreement between the Great Powers themselves" and thus to secure "peace in Europe" (in Stickney 1926:34). The Greeks took the statement as a confession of political expediency; the Albanians did not and felt the principle of nationality had been vindicated (Vrioni 1921:478). But the de facto confusions of the border area from 1913 until after World War I afforded both parties the opportunity to develop and state their cases. At the same time, there is nothing final about ideological oppositions that are, after all, based on the exigencies of historical circumstance. If Albania and Greece initially presented contrasting ideas about the principles of collective identity, they eventually found themselves facing similar problems with respect to their national minorities.

culture and civilization: domestic and public

The dispute about Northern Epiros from 1913 to the 1920s takes place in the idiom of a contest over the relative place of domestic culture and public civilization in social and political life. Both Greece and Albania (that is, their representatives at the international congresses and their expatriate lobbyists—the role of American-based Greek and Albanian spokesmen was critical here) state their Europeanness, their claim to a Western political complexion, in European terms, but differently. Greece was invoked by Europe as its "intellectual and political source," the "primordial ancestor of Europe itself" (Herzfeld 1993:5, 25 and 1986a), but for the Balkan nations, images of antiquity—whether political or architectural—were only useful in as much as they already signified European modernity.

Civilization, or *politismos,* was clearly understood by the Greeks in the French sense, as a question of political development and its "spread to other peoples" (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952:12).[24] Norbert Elias's portrait of this notion of civilization in *The History of Manners* (1978) is helpful in understanding the terms of the Greco-Albanian dispute. In 18th- and 19th-century Europe, civilization is a question of social relations and public behavior, expressed by individual internalization of social manner and physical discipline. In its original, verbal French form, "to civilize" signified a process: expansionist, colonizing, of universal potential. It involved a structure of behavior and knowledge that emerged out of the particular circumstances of French political development, especially its high degree of centralization. The civilizing of peoples is the improvement, that is the remodeling, of their manners and institutions. As Louis XIV remarked of his approach to the assimilation of newly annexed provinces in the Pyrenees: "I did not see myself practicing what the Greeks and Romans did, namely sending colonies of

their own subjects into freshly conquered territories, I tried to establish French customs in them" (quoted in Sahlins 1989:117).

In the late 18th century, with the rise of the bourgeoisie in France, civilization becomes, through its role in colonialism, a logic of national—rather than courtly or merely elite—self-consciousness. The process of civilization at home being complete, the task is to transfer it to others.

By contrast, in late-18th-century Germany, civilization is, as Elias writes, a value of the "second rank" (1978:6). German intellectuals pay their respects to the concept of culture. Culture is based on the ideas of sincerity, authenticity, and accomplishment. The stress is on inherent potentiality, on the particular genius of a group or individual, on what is "natural": the natural easily becomes the "racial." One has only to think of Goethe's *Sorrows of Young Werther* for the prototype of this feeling: everything weighs against rules, good taste, social convention, and bourgeois life and in favor of the "patriarchal life" and its "simple, innocent delights" practiced without "affectation" (1971:33–34). Everything is more genuine among the simple people: "We educated people," Werther laments, "miseducated into nothingness" (1971:105). Werther disdains the court and exalts the peasant household. The poet Herder's (1744–1803) attraction to the songs and tales of the folk manifested this same ambivalence about civilization (Burke 1978:3–12), as did, a century later, the invention of a nonracialist anthropological notion of culture with a small "c" (cultures as unique, incommensurable societies).[25]

Elias's study places Germany's romantic essentialism in the context of its problem of unification, its relationship to France and the courtly life, and the resentful subordination of its bourgeoisie to an ineffective political elite, in other words, in the context of the particular historical problem of its self-consciousness. Likewise, use of the concepts of civilization and (domestic) culture in Greece and Albania is and was related to these same problematics in each of these emerging states: each adopts the idiom suited to its particular situation.[26] The question before the border commissions was nothing less than the central issue of turn-of-the-century anthropology, namely the puzzle of "race," language, culture, and civilization.

the justification of the border

When the question of territorial limits arose at the Conference of the Ambassadors in August, 1913, after the Peace of Bucharest, the Powers stated that the precise borders of Albania were to be set by a commission. The decision was to be supported ethnographically. That is, the population was to be identified according to its "maternal tongue . . . the language spoken in family life," taking no account of "plebiscites or other political manifestations" [27] (Conference Propaganda, in Stickney 1926:34). In practical terms, the commission was a not a great success. The investigative process was seriously flawed, and the commission split into two camps along national lines. The representatives of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) maintained that on the basis of language, all the districts were Albanian; the representatives of the Entente (Great Britain, France, Russia), on the other hand, noted their Greekness in commercial and intellectual life and aspiration. Through a British compromise following the stalemate of the commission, the Protocol of Florence designated a border considerably to the south of the line demanded by the Greeks. Between 1913 and 1919, the zone was variously occupied by French, Italian, and Greek troops. As a consequence of continued turbulence and changes in the political landscape brought about by the war, the border came under review for a second time in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference.

Following the new logic of self-determination (as articulated in particular by Wilson and the Americans), the argument in Paris appeared to be about population statistics. In this sense, the parties agreed that on the subject of national identity, there is no truer poll than a census (Horowitz 1985). But the significance of the census categories was deeply disputed. There were

clearly some people who spoke Greek as a mother tongue, and there were clearly a number of Muslims and a much larger number of Orthodox who spoke Albanian as a family language. Like the Christian Slav speakers of Macedonia, this last was the group that was up for grabs. The Official Greek Memorandum to the Peace Conference asserted that Greece was not interested in Muslim districts, only in those with a mixed Greek and Albanian Orthodox population. The reasoning was bluntly stated: "It would be contrary to all equity that, in a given people, a majority which possesses a higher form of civilization should have to submit to a minority possessing an inferior civilization" (Delegation Propaganda, in Stickney 1926:79). The Greek party entirely rejected the linguistic argument: "The democratic conceptions of the Allied and Associated Powers," they insisted, "cannot admit of any other standard than national consciousness. Only the Germanic [or "Teutonic"] conception could substitute for this the standard of race or of language" (Delegation Propaganda, in Stickney 1926:79).

Advocates of the Greek case made the same argument in the philhellenic literature with reference to the Slav speakers of Macedonia:

> Why are some "Greeks" in Macedonia "Slavonic in speech?" As you know, Greek is a learned language, too complicated for unlettered people. And whenever a learned tongue comes into competition with a simpler idiom, it is driven out, it disappears. Only educated people can write and speak it. And this is what has happened in Macedonia. The flux and reflux of Bulgarian and Servian invasion has deposited an alluvium of Slavonic words that have become, little by little, the Slavo-Macedonian dialect—a patois of which the vocabulary is very limited and which is at the level of the lowest intelligences. To this patois both Bulgars and Servians lay claim. [Paillares 1910:152]

An undercurrent of racialist assumptions is apparent here but is subordinate to civilizational claims. There is a clear analogy to the case of the Chams of Tsamouria in Greek Epiros. As Mikhalopoulos notes, these Muslim Albanian speakers were generally regarded in Greece as converted descendants of (Greek) Thesprotians, having abandoned Greek speech because of pressure from the Muslim beys (1993:20). And yet, Paillares, who suggests (above) that Slavic-speaking Macedonians are almost geologically passive, insists: "The unique, the exclusive, the indisputable mark of nationality is the will of the individual" (1910:157). Thus "the Greek is a Greek, because he feels that he is Greek, and not because he is of Hellenic stock" (Berl 1910:245). As such, he is nothing less than the "representative of Western ideas in the East" (Berl 1910:245).

As one contemporary observer put it, in the diplomatic exchanges at Paris it was a contest between "race and language" on the Albanian side and "culture [read high culture, that is, civilization, in this usage][28] and religion" on the Greek side (Burrows 1918, cited in Stickney 1926:87). For his part, Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, agreed, in Paris in 1919, that "a substantial portion of this Greek population has Albanian as its mother tongue, and is consequently, in all probability, of Albanian origin. . . . It is also known that the culture [read, civilization] of Northern Epirus has been Greek" (1919:2–3). Nevertheless, the League of Nations did not ultimately equate this educational culture with politics. The League concluded that "the Hellenophile sentiments of the majority of the Orthodox population of Southern Albania are not to be described as Greek nationalism" (Sederholm 1923:500).[29]

If Greek statements expressed the problem of national consciousness through the idiom of civilization, Albanian arguments to the Conference in official and unofficial documents reflect the opposite strategy. The Albanians spoke about origins, kinship, language, and race: they described themselves as the "most ancient [race] of the Balkans" (Memorandum 1919:781) and claimed Philip and Alexander as collateral ancestors (Konitza 1919:773). The Delegation propaganda argued that Albanian survival in the face of repeated invasion, Albanian resistance to direct Turkish rule, and a flexible accommodation of Islam constitute evidence of national spirit, and not (as the Greeks implied) of collaboration, lack of identity, or self-identification with Turks. The spokesmen conceptualized Albanian national unity on the basis of a local autochthonous culture independent of the learned traditions of Turks and Greeks. They

proposed the domestic language (not the lingua franca of the public sphere) as a criterion for national consciousness. Like the Greeks, they made territorial demands, claiming for themselves, on the grounds of a majority Albanian-speaking Muslim population, the district of Chameria (or Tsamouria, that is, Epiros at least as far south as Preveza) and the (largely Vlach) Pindus. (While the Greeks claimed the Vlachs as Romanized Greeks, the Albanians, more often than not, saw them as Romanized and Hellenized Illyrians. Konitza [1919], however, took an agnostic position.)[30]

In 1919, then, the Albanians attacked the Greek concept of national consciousness and civilization as a thinly disguised transformation of the utopia of the Greek Patriarch (which, to stress the "Oriental" connotations, they often called Ottoman or Byzantine): a utopia of many nations under one religion (subordinate to the Greek element).[31] In reaction, the Albanian utopia crystallized as the logical opposite to that of the Greeks. Emphasizing blood and kinship through the medium of language, it constituted itself as profoundly indifferent to religious divisions—and on these grounds both Western and modern. Greek spokesman Cassavetes conflated Moslem Albanian and Turk, comparing the Greeks in southern Albania to Armenians (1921:473) at the mercy of the "Moslem element" (1921:471). Albanian official Vrioni responded that, quite to the contrary, Albanians have nothing in common with Turks. There is certainly no such creature as a Turko-Albanian, he argued: "The Turk belongs to the Turanian race, whereas the Albanian belongs to an Arian race" (1921:478).

Alongside the principle of civilization, the Greek party, like the French immediately after the revolution of 1789, ranked the category of "struggle" as paramount in civil identity. In the Constitution of Troezen (1827), those who "struggled" were Greeks, and so, in Article 4, "districts of Greece are considered the ones that took up arms against Ottoman rule" (Koliopoulos 1990:100). In the introduction to his study of the Chams, Greek historian Mikhalopoulos employs this argument against the claims of the Chams to minority status. According to Mikhalopoulos, in order to qualify as a "minority," as a "people" as opposed to a simple "aggregate," the Chams must demonstrate that they have established themselves in place "through struggle" (1993:13). The political distribution and varied involvements of Albanians were too complex in 1919 for the Albanian party to invoke this criterion.

In these confrontations, legitimacy was framed as a contest between mutually exclusive competing principles. Nevertheless, once the border was established a new set of problems complicated this ideological opposition. Like Greece, Albania began to institute its own forms of nation-building. Predictably, these included efforts to limit the public-cultural rights of its new minorities in the name of a state civilization. For its part, Greece was faced simultaneously with a set of exo-Greeks (whom they called Northern Epirotes) in Albania and with an Albanian-speaking minority within Greek Epiros that, because it was Muslim, fell into the Albanian national category (according to the rules of debate of 1913). And thus Greece too was compelled to realign its domestic and public distinctions.

education and the minority question

The confirmation of the border divided the states of Albania and Greece, but the division or allocation of populations is inevitably a much more drawn-out affair. If the struggles over the border had rested on the reciprocal claims that Christian Orthodox populations (and those with Greek aspirations) belonged in Greece, and Albanian speakers belonged in Albania, the imposition of the border left each state with an incompatible minority. The fate and significance of Greek education in southern Albania on the one hand and the destiny of the Muslim Chams in Greek Epiros on the other can be considered together as a product of the contradictions of national identity during this period. These contradictions were reflected in the proliferation of terms applied to the Chams in Greek state documents of the 1920s. They were called, variously,

Greek citizens *(polites)*, Greek nationals *(ipikoi)*, people of Muslim allegiance *(fronima)*, Albanian nationals with Greek citizenship, Greek nationals of Albanian origin, Ottoman nationals, and so on.[32] Similar claims about political and economic rights, special schooling, and religious freedom were made on behalf of each minority by its patron state. In a decision against the petitions of the Chams, the international courts clearly ruled in 1928 against any advocacy of a foreign state with regard to another state's internal minorities. In 1935, Greece nevertheless pursued the defense of the Greek minority in Albania in the Court at The Hague, and its arguments there reflect interpretations of nationality remarkably different from those expressed in 1919.

Tensions surrounding these issues were connected to Greece's disastrous military campaign in Asia Minor in 1922. Greece not only lost its bid to claim territory in Anatolia, but the Greek Orthodox Christian population was for the most part expelled from Turkey in an exchange of populations with a smaller population of Muslims in Greece. The influx of refugees and the collapse of the Great Idea—the anticipated expansion of the Greek state to contiguous territories historically inhabited by Greeks—had profound effects on Greece's self-consciousness and on its policies with reference to the diaspora (the Greeks abroad). In any event, the Chams, in theory if not entirely in practice, were, along with some Albanian Muslims in western Macedonia, exempted from the exchange of populations. In 1923, the Italian representative at Lausanne (the Italians pursued their own interests in godparenting Albania) insisted that Albanian Muslims in Greece not be exported to Turkey, and the Greek representatives assented. Those who were defined as "Muslims, Greek *ipikoi* [subjects, citizens], Albanian *fili* [race, tribe]" were not to be grouped with "Turks" (Mikhalopoulos 1993:50).

Mikhalopoulos gives a detailed account of the subsequent contests and deliberations. In due course, various parties accused the Greek government of expelling Albanians from Tsamouria in order to give land to Orthodox refugees from Anatolia. The question again devolved on the definition of who was, or was not, an Albanian Muslim. A mixed commission (consisting of a Swede, a Greek, and a Turk) investigated the matter. The commission's view was that individuals who could establish that they or one of their ancestors in the paternal line came from the Albanian *periferia* (periphery) could stay in Greece. On the other hand it was necessary that Turkish "intention" *(ipopsi)* and national consciousness *(ethniki sinidhisi)* be lacking, that is, that these individuals have no wish to emigrate to Turkey. The exemption was to be granted only to those who "not only really were but wished to be considered of Albanian origin" (Mikhalopoulos 1993:38). Thus the first criterion was to be place of origin (if from Turkey, individuals must leave); the second criterion was ethniki sinidhisi (ethnic or national consciousness)—though, in itself, the manifestation of an ethnic or national consciousness was not sufficient. Finally, language would, it was vaguely stated, constitute "a fundamental criterion" (Mikhalopoulos 1993:39).

What followed, naturally, was a struggle over what constituted the manifestation of ethnic or national consciousness and a debate over whether or not the Chams did or did not really wish to join the exchange and emigrate to Turkey. The Governor General of Epiros, Minos Petikhakis, declared that the Chams were without doubt "Muslim human beings with Muslim fronima" who have been forced by propaganda to revise their identities (Mikhalopoulos 1993:49). The Turkish representative insisted that only those of Turkish origin and Turkish mother tongue should emigrate; the desire of the Chams to emigrate was not proof of national consciousness because it was merely a reaction to current hardships (indeed the Commission of 1925 found that many who wished to leave were responding to anxieties about their land). The Turks viewed national consciousness as ephemeral and influenced by circumstances. In the event, the Greeks (and indeed some Chams) pushed for the inclusion of a number of Chams in the exchange; the Turks pushed to reduce the number; the Albanians and the Italians, to keep the Chams in place in Greece.

The rapprochement between Albania and Greece under the dictatorship of General Theodhoros Pangalos in the mid 1920s resulted in a bilateral agreement on the Chams and the Greeks in Albania; the Greek government agreed to exempt the Chams from the exchange and to dissolve the (Greek) North Epirote *sillogi* (civic associations) the existence of which had annoyed Tirana. The Albanians agreed to the operation of Greek schools and to some mediation in the case of disputes concerning the jurisdiction of the autocephalous Church of Albania. Pangalos officially recognized the Albanians of Tsamouria as a minority within Greece. In the end, none of this resolved the issues. By 1928, the Albanian government made formal protests concerning the seizure of Cham land by Greek refugees, the lack of special schooling, pressure to leave Greece, and forced hard labor in army service.

The story of the fate of the Chams is too complex to sum up here. What is important for my purpose is the part they played in the development of a discourse on minorities across the Albanian-Greek border. The discussions of 1928 are especially revealing. The Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, even while insisting on the rights of the Chams, justifies the closure of Greek schools in Albania. It is natural, he asserted, that as "foundations for foreign propaganda" they had to be closed in the interests of establishing a "national culture" (Mikhalopoulos 1993:94). In response, Politis, Special Envoy from Greece to the Court, accused Albania of interfering in the internal affairs of a state with regard to its own citizens (the Chams here defined as *Ellines polites,* Greek citizens).

What then of the case of the Greeks of southern Albania? After 1926 and until World War II, the Greek government ceased officially to articulate irredentist aspirations with regard to Northern Epiros. The problematic of the Greek population in Albania was transformed into an issue of minority rights—and thus the Greeks were transformed into a minority. If education had represented to the Greeks the essence of Greek civilization, it was also the focal point of their distress within the Albanian state.[33]

According to Greek sources, in 1914 there were 589 Greek language schools in southern Albania (Giorgiou 1993:285; see also Georgoulis 1995). The number of Greek schools in southern Albania dwindled to 78 in 1925–26; and to 10 (with 11 teachers) in 1932–33 (Giorgiou 1993:285). In 1933–34, there were no Greek schools in operation in Albania. The schools had been closed under Article 206 of the Albanian constitution, which forbade private schools of any kind within Albania. It is worth noting that Albanian schools had been suppressed by both Greek and Turkish interests before 1912, but in 1910, as a compromise measure, the Greeks moved to allow Albanian to be taught in Greek schools in southern Albania (Aarbakke 1992; Sederholm 1923:494).

The Albanian government presented the closing of the schools to the international courts as part of a general policy intended to thwart foreign influence—Italian as well as Greek—in Albania, claiming the measure essential to assuring the moral unity of the Albanian nation and to distancing it from the old Ottoman (by which they meant the Greek) system of education. The court at The Hague ruled in favor of Greece on the basis of the Treaty on Minorities, with Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands dissenting.

The statements of the Greek party reflect an emphasis on the significance of schooling familiar since at least the 1890s, but an emphasis that has been rearticulated in the face of the new problem of minority status. Technically, the Greek argument rests on an Ottoman conception of the educational system, which allowed three types of schools—state schools, community or millet schools under the supervision of a religious leader, and private schools "opened in the name of private persons" individually responsible to the authorities (Aarbakke 1992:70). In 1935, the Greeks argued that Greek schools in Albania are not private schools (forbidden by Article 206) but community schools *(écoles communautaires)*—therefore, in a sense, still state schools. As Greek representative G. Lagoudakis argued before the court at The Hague in February of 1935, "By their attachment to those communities whose free development they are

meant to ensure, minority schools have the same character [as those of the state]: they are community schools, that is, institutions of public jurisdiction *[droit]*" (quoted in Papadakis 1958:102).

While the Albanians argued their case on the grounds of equal treatment under the law, Politis responded that formal equality hides an unequal result, and that, for minorities, education in a state school constitutes a "divorce" between a child's education and his "familial and national formation." Politis protested:

> The Albanian government does not even seem to question, Sirs, that in wanting to bring the Greek minority into a national and moral unity such as it conceived it, it violates the most essential base of minority rights that guarantees the conservation of moral and national traditions special to each minority, in conformity with the genius of its race *(la génie de sa race)*. [quoted in Papadakis 1958:123]

Politis's use of the term *race* is indicative of a general shift toward a concept that, while not in any sense crudely racialist, recognizes the domestic culture of a minority as an index of nationality and the locus of rights. His statement responds classically to the predicament of a group that defines itself as a cultural minority. Remember that in 1919, Greek spokesman Cassavetes, appealing to a Euro-American court of popular opinion, had presented the Northern Epiros question as a question not of race but of sentiment. After all, he writes, "what is nationality, if not the will to live with this or that political organization?" (1919:904). In 1935, the nationality of the Greek minority in Albania could not be framed as political will.

In 1935, Politis clearly saw the dangers of the concept of the moral unity of the state. In a similar vein, Brubaker has recently described the misgivings of minorities in the republics of the former Soviet Union:

> They will seek a form of citizenship that is mediated by nationality, that is, by membership in an ethnocultural group. They will be suspicious of liberal forms of citizenship, in which rights attach directly to individuals, and group membership has no political significance; for they will see such formally liberal models as ideological masks for substantively ethnocratic forms of rule, assuring cultural predominance and political hegemony of the dominant state-bearing nation, and disregarding what they regard as the public, collective rights of ethnocultural minorities. [1994:75]

Politis's communitarian invocation of a "familial and national formation" in contrast to that of the state was dictated by the exigencies of the relationship between education and Greek consciousness and the enduring stress on consciousness in the definition of identity. Resistance to applying these same norms to the Chams was the result not only of politics as usual but also of the sense that consciousness was not an element of their identity, since it attached to no Albanian civilizational-educational complex.[34]

The discussions about minority status in Albania were cut short by events. In 1934, Poland renounced its commitment to the Minority Treaty of 1919. In 1935, Germany left the League of Nations (Papadakis 1958:128). In 1939, the Italian invasion of Albania began a new phase in Greco-Albanian relations that, as I have said above, ultimately ended (with the departure of most, if not all, of the remaining Chams to Albania) in the closing of the frontier.

Nationalist sentiment during periods of crisis looks for testimony of the most enduring and extreme nature according to the conventions of the times—conventions such as self-determination, race, and geography. As an exemplar of Northern Epirot extremism, the anti-Albanian tract written during World War II by senior conservative politician Pipinelis (close to the King, later an envoy of the dictatorship) is hard to match. Finding all other standards too vulnerable, he resorts to geological and transcendental criteria of national identity. For Pipinelis, a former representative from Greece to Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, it is self-evident that cultural homogeneity is the chief axiom of statehood. He sees no grounds in either high or low culture for Albanian unity. "The Albanian movement, " he writes, "was not distinguished by any single national characteristic" (Pipinelis n.d.:22). The separation of Albania into two dialectal regions (Gheg and Tosk) and differences of ethnology between the autonomous tribes in the north and the southern estates must argue against a single state; differences of "historical experience"

between the north and the south (principally the contrast between Latin and Byzantine dominion) make unification illogical (Pipinelis n.d.:29). According to Pipinelis, if it showed any national consciousness (civilizational consciousness), the Albanian movement was fundamentally Turkish. Equally problematic in his view (and it is important to realize that this was not an argument about the practicality of the state, but about its logic) was the absence of formal Culture ("no urban class . . . no original literature"; Pipinelis n.d.:31). Nor, he asserts, is there any compensation in the field of culture (lower-case "c"): "no popular poetry . . . few folksongs . . . and then not of Albanian origin" (Pipinelis n.d.:21). Lack of a national consciousness ("shallowness with regard to national feeling") is the cause and the result of the lack of a proper "struggle" to win independence: "In the last analysis a people's right to independence is not merely an abstract right, derived from international law, but one that is acquired through its struggles and its cultural and civilizing values" (Pipinelis n.d.:34). As a final argument, Pipinelis asserts that in national questions "the human factor represented by the inhabitants, is usually of a transitory and unstable character." The fundamental part consists, rather, in "geography, nature, the spirit of the inhabitants . . . the living past of countless centuries" (Pipinelis n.d.:70).[35]

contiguity and continuity

It is important to remember that just as there was a period of Greek-Slav alliance, there was also a tradition of Greek-Albanian unity. In the first stages of their opposition to the Ottoman Turks, the Muslim Albanian Tosks called upon the Greeks for support, and they received it.[36] After the Berlin Conference, both Greeks and Albanians considered a Greco-Albanian federation an attractive possibility. In publications from the 1870s and 1880s, Greeks hail the Albanians as fellow Pelasgians (cf. Paskhidis 1879 and Koupitoris 1879).[37] In this way, Greek activists assert the common autochthonous character of Greeks and Albanians by contrast to Turks (and in some cases Bulgars).[38] This ideological thread continues until the present; it was prominent among those in the Greek government who themselves came from Arvanitika-speaking communities—as so many, like the distinguished Koundouriotis family, did. The importance of the Arvanite factor in the vicissitudes of the concept of a Greek nationality should not be underestimated. Indeed, the ethnopolitical literature written by Arvanites draws heavily on the rhetoric we have described above for Albania (cf. the "tribal" and "heroic" character of the Arvanites; see Kollias 1985). But Arvanitika speakers have it both ways and also appear as true Hellenes, authentic descendents of the ancients, preserved by westerly isolation from the corruption of the "Anatolian Byzantine" (Hart 1993).[39]

Hobhouse reports from his trip to Albania, or Epiros, or Greece (he uses the terms in alternation) in 1809 that at the village of Paramythi, Turks (Albanian Muslims) and Christians freely intermarried and that one might find boiling on the family stove "a piece of mutton and a piece of pork in the same pot for the wife and husband of different persuasions" (1971:150). Other travelers make the same point: Bérard reports that Albanian dervishes enjoy pork under the name "Algerian mutton" and that the Christians, for their part, observe Ramadan and circumcise their sons (1911:16). A century after Hobhouse, Baerlein reports that in Khimarra the mixed population cooks a half-meat, half-Lenten pie for its biconfessional festivities (1963:97). The pork-and-mutton theme eventually became a stock trope of literature on Epiros, as the eclectic salad became the trope of Macedonia.

With the introduction of nation-state borders and the predication of nationhood on the border, this heterogeneity is construed as a weakness. This is nowhere more evident than in the most radical Greek challenges to Albanian claims to nationhood, which have accused Albania of illegitimacy on the sole grounds of the heterogeneity of its culture, geography, language, and—contrary to Albanian ideology—"race." [40] The more this line of reasoning is pursued, the more Greece itself is forced into what its representatives publicly called in 1919, "German"

rhetoric.[41] Whereas, in 1919, Hellenic civilization was seen by advocates of the Greek nation as elevating disparate linguistic communities, in the later interwar period and in the more recent past, allophony itself, understood as implying much more than language, is construed as a threat to the Hellenic community (Carabott 1997; Karakasidou 1997a, 1997b).

In 1919, Greek advocates argued for a notion of national consciousness conceived as a function of the political will of heterogeneous elements. This concept of nationality has had uneven success in the course of the 20th century.[42] In Greece, as elsewhere, the scope of the term *nation* is often unclear. Thus the term *national consciousness* (ethniki sinidhisi) can signify that mental property which an individual of any ethnic background must (according to nationalist rhetoric) possess as a Greek citizen, or the national self-consciousness by virtue of which a citizen of another country, such as Albania, is constituted as an ethnic Greek.[43]

Within each state, those who confront the majority ethnic regime at the border know the ironies of national self-discovery from the inside. They may end up skeptics, or they may "discover themselves" (see Danforth 1995:197–251). On the one hand, the flux of border areas always threatens to shatter the part-for-whole identification of citizen and state embedded in the notion of self-rule. On the other hand, it is in sorting out these border populations that national selves are fabricated. At political borders, national efforts to convert some contiguities into continuities and others into discontinuities is a long-term project.[44] Demarcation is only the beginning of a process that, as the case of Greece and Albania demonstrates (but so do they all), can feed almost limitlessly on the ambiguities of the idea of nation.

notes

1. The English translators of Schirmer's 1952 vocal score either do not get the point at all or assume that the audience will not. The passage is translated as: "Did they come from Patagonia, or perhaps from Timbuctoo? The Congo? China? Turkey? Malaya?" (da Ponte 1952:96).

2. The historian Stavro Skendi, referring to the instability of Catholic and Orthodox allegiances, has applied the word *amphibious* to premodern Albania (Skendi 1967).

3. I am grateful to Alex Kitroeff for this reference. The slogan in question is not a new one, but a transformation of the standard slogan: Dhen ekhete *omadha* [You don't have a *team*]. Typically, slogans are replete with graphic sexual and ethnic slurs, playing on both sex and nation (see Buford 1993). Athens fans call the team associated with refugees from Asia Minor *khanoumisses* (Turkish women) and the team from Thessaloniki *Voulgari* (Bulgarians).

4. Albanian names that appear to Greeks to signify Greek origin (Athanassi, Dhimitra, Vassiliki) may only signify, to Albanians, an Orthodox background. Names of Latin, Illyrian, and Turkish origin flourish in Albanian genealogies. Bérard (1911:16) notes: "Presque tous s'appellent Osman fils de Vasili, Mehmet fils de Georgi, accouplant ainsi leur prénom musulman au nom de père ou d'ancêtre chrétien" [Almost all are called Osman son of Vasili, Mehmet son of Georgi, thus attaching their Muslim first name to the name of a Christian father or ancestor]. Double names were also the consequence of using Christian names at home and Muslim names before the authorities. Enver Hoxha's ban on religion from 1967 forward produced a generation of Albanians relatively unaware of these distinctions; some secularist Albanians fear that with the revival of religious practice this state of affairs is not to last. In the southern Peloponnese, before Greek independence, some Christian children were given Muslim names by Muslim Albanian godparents (Andromedas 1976:203).

5. The role of the United States in Greek-Albanian relations is substantial. Albanians have claimed some affinity with American ideas of the melting pot. While the United States Congress passed several resolutions in defense of Greece's interests in southern Albania throughout the critical post–World War I period, it also intervened to safeguard the integrity of Albanian statehood in 1919 when the Powers were on the verge of dividing it among its neighbors. Certainly in recent times American involvement has been perceived in Greece as pro-Albanian (and pro-Muslim) and anti-Greek. A sample from the Greek press: "Nevertheless we'll have problems with Van der Stol, Christopher, Clinton, Kohl, and the rest, who will tear their clothes

to shreds protesting about the oppression of the Albanian immigrants by the Greek state, what with depriving them of the right to rob and murder according to their manners and customs" (Politis 1994; but see Liakos 1994 for another view).

6. An ethnographic view of the border is provided in more detail in "Domesticity and Displacement: Habitation on the Northwest Borders of Greece" (Hart in press).

7. The principal domestic languages or dialects include: (1) The Slav dialect spoken in Macedonia which, in the 19th century, was widely called Bulgarian but is now called *Makedhonika* (Macedonian) by its speakers in Greece and by most linguists. Monolingual Greeks often use *Slavic* to mean *Macedonian* (as in the Greek term of reference for its speakers, Slavophones). It is also euphemistically called *ta dopika* (the local tongue); (2) Aromanian (or, in Greek, *Vlakhika*); (3) Albanian (southern dialect) and Arvanitika, the dialect spoken in Greece since the 1400s; and (4) Pontic Greek. In Greece, of course, standard Greek is the language of commercial, educational, and religious life.

8. Describing the First Balkan War, an Albanian source from 1919 explains that "Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria threw themselves upon the Turks in order to obtain portions of Albania before she should have time to establish herself" (Konitza 1919:766). The Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913) that established the frontiers of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece was followed in short order by the Protocol of Florence (December 17, 1913) a year after the independence of Albania was recognized. This protocol assigned to the new state areas of southern Albania contested by Greece. In May 1913, Greece had signed the Treaty of London conceding territory in Northern Epiros in exchange for sovereignty in the Aegean Islands and the Dodecanese. But in July, Italy withdrew consent to Greek sovereignty in the Dodecanese. Renewed competition in Albania inevitably followed.

9. Maria Todorova's recent work (1992) on the formation of tropes of national character in Bulgaria makes a similar point with regard to the segmentary generation of stereotypes in that country.

10. The stereotype, literal and metaphorical, has a fundamentally modern aspect connected to the communicative field of nations. The stereotype printing process, necessary for large editions of printed material, was patented in a French-German collaboration in 1798. The figurative use of the word appears some 20 or 30 years later. The process involves making dupicate plates of pages of (moveable) type by means of poured moulds. The plates, as opposed to the pages of type, are fixed. Unlike a rumor, a stereotype is not susceptible to variation and context and is oriented toward mass communication.

11. The popular joke about European national types provides a fine example of the proposition that, in the formation of nation-states, "European ideology portrayed the internal disunity of the European peoples as a transcendent unity" (Herzfeld 1993:77). (Question: What's the difference between heaven and hell? Answer: In heaven, the policemen are British, the cooks are French, the mechanics are German, the bankers are Swiss, and the lovers are Italian; in hell, the policemen are German, the cooks are British, the mechanics are French, the bankers are Italian, and the lovers are Swiss.) In Goethe's lifetime, the lovers in heaven might have been German (McDonald 1993:229), but the joke invents a Europe that is complete, closed, and timeless. In *Cracking India,* Bapsi Sidwa's novel about the partition of India and Pakistan, the splitting of personal relationships along religious-group lines and the internalization of the conflict is marked by the appearance of ethnic jokes (1991:104).

12. According to Wilkes, before the dispersal of the Slavs the line between the areas of the Latin and Greek languages fell roughly in the valley of the Shkumbin (along the route of the Via Egnatia) in central Albania. But Wilkes also states that the population of the more southern area between the Aous River and Ochrid were "Latin speaking provincials, in the interior mainly of Illyrian origin, but more cosmopolitan in the coastal towns" (1992:273). In any event, the arrival of the Slavs set the seal on linguistic heterogeneity and prevented the hegemony of any single language. Despite linguistic nationalism, multilingualism at national borders today can draw on new sources such as access to international television.

13. The author explains: "No doubt with reference to the monks of earlier times" (Recatas 1934:14).

14. Their music-making was indispensable to the ritual life of the town (a marriage could not take place without them) just as the material exchanges between pastoralists and agriculturalists were indispensable to survival in the relatively infertile mountains.

15. Hellenizing (male) Vlachs, for example, tended to marry hellenized (female) Vlachs or poor Greek brides, thus establishing the domestic language as Greek. Muslim Albanians might take Greek wives, maintaining some features of a bicultural household at least in the first generation. Greek men might in principle marry only other Orthodox. Contemporary observers insist that linguistically distinct groups, while distinguished on the plane of language or occupation, might also share much in style of life: "The Greek, Slav, Roumanian, Albanian of the Mountains resemble one another more than they do their compatriots of the plains" (Ancel 1926:135, quoted in Recatas 1934:2). Likewise, the Greek tenant farmer who was not a merchant (and not, according to Hobhouse, "dressed as a European" [1971:28]) resembled his Bulgar counterparts in his poverty and subjection to the Turk. Kitroeff (1993:13) cites Margaritis Dhimitsas's four volume *Ancient Geography of Macedonia* (1874): "The Slavo-Bulgarians stand on the bottom rung of intellectual development, and are almost exclusively engaged in agriculture and cattle-raising. . . . Among [the Slavs] the Serbs are noted for their care over intellectual and political development and the Montenegrins for their heroism."

16. Not only this, but Slavic (Macedonian Slavs, Bulgarians, Serbs, etc.), Jewish, and Armenian traders were often identified in Germany, Austria, and Hungary as Greeks: "The religious connotation yielded even to the economic: a 'Greek' was above all a peddler or merchant, and in this sense even a Jew could be a 'Greek' " (Stoianovich 1992:50).

17. Note that this was true for the Latin-speaking Vlachs, who were Orthodox. According to Stoianovich, the commercial diaspora of the 18th-century southern Balkans was "ethnically Vlach (or partly Vlach) and culturally Greek or under Greek influence" (1992:40). This is certainly obvious, for example, in the case of Monastir or Bitola (Aarbakke 1992).

18. Hirschon (personal communication, October 11, 1994) observes that refugees from Asia Minor spoke of an opposition between themselves and the "Greeks," their neighbors in Athens, despite the fact that their repatriation to Greece was based on their own "Greek" identity (see also Herzfeld 1986c). Anthropological critiques of stereotoypes of tribalism emphasize the predominance of cross-cutting allegiances in so-called tribal societies by comparison with modern ethnicities and nationalities (see Southall 1970). For example, in the Pindus the Kopatschar were a distinct group of Greek speakers of Vlach origin and costume who were Orthodox (Wace and Thompson 1914:13) and, at Kastoria, the Valachades, another distinct group of Greek speakers, were Muslims who followed a Vlach style of life (Aarbakke 1992:22).

19. A Greek encyclopedia published in 1930 provides some interesting details about the identity of the Liapides. They are described as Muslim inhabitants of Liapouria (the southwest section of Albania between the Boiousis and Kalamas Rivers). They are, in all probability, the same people who moved in the 14th and 15th centuries into mainland Greece as well as Hydra, Spetses, and other islands. They are said to be warriors, builders (a traditional occupation of southern Albanians and Arvanites until today), and artisans, as well as brigands and pirates. They do not employ the term *Shkiptar* (the dominant Albanian language term for Albanians) but retain their ethnic names and the term *Arvanites.* They wear the *fustanella* (kilt) by contrast to the Northern Albanians who "dress like Slavs" (*Engkiklopedhiko Lexiko* 1930:672). Ali Pasha was a Liapis. According to Bowen, "Aly Pasha having been born at Tepeleni, was a Liapis by birth; but as this tribe was in disrepute among the other Albanians for their poverty and predatory habits, he thought proper to call Tepeleni a town of the Toshkes; and no one dared to dispute his geography until after his death" (1852:192). In northern Albania, a tribal or clan structure was in place; in southern Albania, a more limited local organization by families *(pharas).*

20. By extension, some distinction can be made between the motivation that Greeks might have felt—in, say, western Macedonia—to privilege the category of Rum, and the feelings the subject Bulgars, paying taxes to Greek tax farmers and supporting Greek priests, may have had about that category (see Karakasidou 1992, 1997a).

21. This is not to say that individuals from the Slav-Macedonian class did not on occasion become part of the elite, only that they moved out of their local category in that case and became hellenized.

22. Political and military functions were the domain of Muslims. Thus Albanian Muslims in Epiros and Macedonia, after the destruction of Ali Pasha's domain, aided the Turks in suppressing Christian rebellions (for example, their role in suppressing the Slav population in the Ilinden uprising of 1903). Like their Christian compatriots in the mountains, some were also brigands, especially in northwest Macedonia. At times, they smuggled arms for Christians (just as Vlach shepherds served as guides both to Bulgarian bands and to their Turkish pursuers during the Macedonian struggle). In the cities of Macedonia, Albanians were with difficulty distinguished from Turks. Aarbakke notes that Weigand says of Skopje that the "Turks" are mostly Albanians who speak Turkish in public and Albanian at home, "but should be regarded as Osmanli" (Aarbakke 1992:10). Conversely, in Korçe, the Albanians, Vlachs, and Slavs spoke Greek in public—a formal Greek, learned from books (Aarbakke 1992:11).

23. In an earlier period, Ali Pasha had forced settlements of Suliotes into the north of his domain and Muslims south to Preveza (Bérard 1911:26).

24. As Herzfeld indicates, "*Politismos . . .* combines the meanings of 'culture' (qua 'high' culture) and 'civilization,' and is particularly associated with the ideal of European identity" (1986a:85). Herzfeld also points out that the opposite of politismos is *varvarotita* (barbarism), a "condition conventionally associated with Turks and other supposedly unenlightened peoples" (1986a:85; see also 1986b). Politismos, in a francophone milieu, also had overtones of the unrelated homophone *politesse* (polished manners). *Polite* has the Latin root *politus* (polished). *Politismos,* a word synthesized by Korais, is formed on the Greek root for citizen *(politis)* in imitation of the derivation of *civilization* from the Latin *civis.* The two distinct meanings are conflated also in the Latin and English concept of urbanity.

25. Kroeber and Kluckhohn's 1952 review of the culture concept emphasizes this distinction. Referring to the *Volkerpsychologie* of Wundt in the 1920s, they write, "Culture, Wundt says, tends to isolate or segregate itself on national lines, civilization to spread its content to other nations" (1952:11). Similarly, they continue, Kant's definition of the term *cultivated* refers to "intrinsic qualities of the person, 'civilized' to improvement of social interrelations" (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952:12). Recent critiques of the culture concept and cultural relativism as they developed in 20th-century anthropology have focused precisely on the functional similarity of the concept of culture to that of race (Bhabha 1992; Just 1989). Racialist theses are not alien to Greek and French notions of civilization (see Kristeva 1991 on the close relationship of civic and ethnic nationalisms), but notions of civilization are not necessarily racialist.

26. Changes in political situation also interfere with the purity of ideological alignments. Under the government of King Constantine, Greece's swing toward Germany in World War I destroyed the previous alliance of French interests with Greek state interests. In fact, for a time, it was clear that France and Greece were competing for the concession of civilizing Albania, with French replacing Greek in schools in Korçe.

27. In the Macedonian conflict of the late 19th century, referenda had been used by the Turks in adjudicating between Exarchists and Patriarchists, that is, between the adherents of an autocephalous

Bulgarian Orthodox Church and adherents of a single (Greek-dominated) Orthodox Church. This policy was widely held to have contributed to the violence of the period.

28. At the risk of confusing the reader, I am obliged to add here that *culture*, at the time of Venizelos as now, could be used in two senses: in the emerging anthropological sense (from the German tradition) or as another term for civilization, conceived of as "high culture."

29. I am grateful to one reader of this manuscript for pointing out that the separation between various elements of national identification in Greece is indeterminate: the Greek terms *fronima* (conviction, belief), *sinidhisi* (conscience, consciousness), and *taftotita* (identity, community, sameness) are all used to refer to national orientation. Here the League was pointing to a separation between formal cultural participation and territorial affiliations.

30. Both sides also present a more prosaic argument. It was generally recognized that Saranda (Santi-Quaranta)-Yannina-Korçe-Florina-Salonika was a vital trade route. According to the Greeks, to cut the Yannina-Korçe link would be to leave only the Metsovo pass open for communications with Salonika. The Greeks describe the pass as unsafe because the road is in poor condition and in the hands of Vlachs.

31. The Patriarchate had judged phyletism—the segmentation of religion according to tribe or race—a heresy. The Patriarchal utopia joined (here I refer to the domestic language) Serbs, Albanians, Bulgars, Greeks, and Vlachs, but divided Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholic (see Kitromilides 1990).

32. A proliferation of terms to describe the Greek diaspora equally reflects diverse understandings of their political position, for example, *dhiaspora* (literally, dissemination), *omoyenia* (of the same descent), *apodhimos ellinismos* (hellenism abroad or emigrant hellenism), and *alitroti* (unredeemed). It is also possible—at least in the case of foreign sports stars on Greek teams—to be made through *omoyeniopiisi* a member of the "community of descent."

33. Before statehood, bloody battles were waged in northern Greece over the control of village schools. Possession of the church was equally if not more significant in the propaganda game. Within the Orthodox millet, the church, under the Patriarch, was the church of all Orthodox groups of different languages. Marriage or baptism in such a church, across ethnic lines, would have been unproblematic. This could not have been true once religion had acquired its national character. Aarbakke cites conflicts between Greeks and Romanian sympathizers over burials. In one case, the Greeks buried a Romanian sympathizer with a Greek liturgy, against his wishes. In another, the Romanian sympathizers insisted that they be allowed to perform a Romanian liturgy at the Greek burial ground (1992:131). Albanians in America trace the founding of the Albanian Church in America to the refusal of the Greek priest in Boston to bury an Albanian. Along with the living, the dead had to play the new politics of identity.

34. Politis is still in some conformity with earlier Greek arguments. He doubts, for example, that, in the absence of national formation at the public level, there could have been an Albanian culture. Before 1921, he notes, there were "a certain number of Greek schools . . . but no Albanian community schools. I can even say, I believe, that there were, strictly speaking, no Albanian communities *(communautés)*: there were Muslim communities, with religious instruction; there were no Albanian communities, with specifically Albanian secular schools" (Papadakis 1958:127). For minorities within Greece, the Greek government now takes the position that the concept of human rights overrides communitarian considerations: "The defense of human rights understood as rights of the single individual are [*sic*] realized to a satisfactory degree precisely within the framework of a state complying with some specified and generally adopted international norms, and not along the way [*sic*] of creating defense systems for differentiated subgroups, communities, etc." (Roussev 1992:229; for a qualification see Pollis 1992).

35. In 1919, quoting Lord Cromer, Cassavetes argued: " 'When a cause invokes historical sentiment on its behalf, that cause is bankrupt of arguments reasonably applicable to the actual situation' " (1919:905). But current arguments between Greeks and Albanians about southern Albania focus on historical and archaeological claims. Albanian sources assert that the Greeks are recent immigrants: "Linguistic and historical data support the notion that this Greek minority arrived in these lands not before the 18th century, when Greek farmers abandoned the arid lands of southern Greece and settled in the fertile lands of Dropulli and Vurgu as tenant farmers of the Albanian feudal lords" (Repishti 1994a:6; see also Prifti 1993:2). By contrast, Greek irredentist sources emphasize the depth of Greek historical presence, especially in the cities of southern Albania, and the relative poverty of Albanian versus Greek land. Thus while Albanian sources point to the inferior political status of ethnic Greeks in the Ottoman empire, Greek sources point to the educational establishments of the Enlightenment period and to the prominence of ethnic Greeks in the intellectual and political formation of Albania.

36. The Albanian Muslim "Tosk" Zenel Gioleka, initiating a rebellion against the Turks in 1847, appealed to Greek Christians for aid and received the support of Prime Minister Kolettis in Athens (Vacalopoulos 1992:450–457).

37. I am grateful to Alex Kitroeff for this reference.

38. Miltiades Seizanes,

who led armed bands in Ottoman held Macedonia, and Thessaly during the abortive Greek uprisings there in 1878 . . . [in 1879] expounded his views that the Greeks should not expect anything from Britian, France or Russia, but should fight side by side with the Albanians against the twin threat of Slavdom and the Ottomans. . . . The Albanians, according to Seizanis, were the only people in the east who were willing to accept Greek hegemony. [Kitroeff 1993:7]

39. Retired Lieutenant-General Alexandros Kontoulis, appointed representative at Dyrrachio in 1925, born at Eleusina, was admired by Pangalos for speaking Albanian perfectly. He was briefly governor of Korçe. When appointed to Dyrrachio, he declared that cooperation between "two people of the same blood *(omaimonon)* like the Greeks and Albanians was always his passion" (Mikhalopoulos 1993:79–82).

40. Of course, some Albanians also construe heterogeneity as a weakness. In a response to Hart 1995, Naum Prifti objected to implications that Albania was in any dimension heterogeneous: "Albanians are among the most compact nations" although religiously tolerant (Budina, personal communication, December 20, 1996).

41. It is important to remember that Venizelos was often at cross purposes with Northern Epirot autonomists, that some members of his cabinet applauded the founding of Albania, and that since 1919 Greece's official position on southern Albania has been moderate. A state of war between Greece and Albania declared in 1940 and lasting until 1987 meant that regular governmental approaches to the question of the Greek minority were impeded, and extremists have often occupied the vacuum (Hart 1995).

42. In an article advocating a civil definition of citizenship, Andonis Liakos pleads the case for separating "nation" and "state" (Liakos 1994:B2).

43. So, for example, "Albanian citizens who emigrate to Greece may acquire, through various channels, a document that asserts that they are of Greek parentage, Orthodox Christian, of Greek ethnicity and 'consciousness' and therefore that they are 'Northern Epirotes' " (Hart 1995:60).

44. Lévi-Strauss argues that racialist or psychobiological social segmentations constitute "false discontinuities" (1970:227) and that societies may also produce systems of false continuities: religion (as opposed to magic) is a system of false continuities and sacrifice is its central element (1970:222–228). Anderson describes patriotism as an interest which, to all appearances, is "interestless" and thus "can ask for sacrifices" (Anderson 1991:144). Both what is sacrificed and where sacrifices occur are worth paying attention to in the analysis of social segmentation: crossroads and territorial boundaries are typical sacrifice sites, and the borders of precolonial polities in some parts of Africa, for example, were marked out by animal sacrifice. These considerations suggest that the sacrifices of national patriots are an integral part of the boundary-making operation.

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